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Debate on the "War Against Terror"

	Mr. Mark Lazarowicz (Edinburgh, North and Leith) (Lab/Co-op): It is more than four months since the Foreign Affairs Committee produced its report. However, far from the passage of time leading to a loss in topicality, the unfolding of events since publication serves only to underline many of the conclusions in the comprehensive report. That continuing validity is particularly true of conclusion 23, which is one of the report's most significant. It states that "the war in Iraq has possibly made terrorist attacks against British nationals and British interests more likely in the short term." Like other hon. Members, I do not want to engage in another debate about the decision to go to war in Iraq in the first place. However, hon. Members on both sides know that one factor that motivated those who, like myself, voted against the war was the view that there was a strong possibility that the outcome of military action might undermine the world community's unity in its efforts to combat terrorism. As a result, the risk of terrorism would be increased, rather than reduced. The events of the past few months in particular seem to be a powerful argument in support of that conclusion, for a number of reasons. That is not just because the obvious instability in Iraq, combined with the insensitive and, at times, brutal way in which the USA has implemented its occupation, has resulted in terrorist acts and the presence of terrorist groups in Iraq that had not previously existed or been able to operate there. It is also because the obvious difficulties, and the weakening of the position of the coalition occupation in Iraq, have made it less likely that in the future—certainly in the near future—the world community will act in a unified fashion in response to the threat of terrorism. The way in which events have developed in Iraq will surely mean that most states, including those that were or are involved in the coalition occupation, will be much less likely to take part in any future collective action designed to combat a terrorist threat, even if it is based on a stronger case and has the UN endorsement that the intervention in Iraq did not possess. Even one of the fall-back positions, as they might be described, that were enunciated by those who originally backed the war in Iraq—that at least it has encouraged other states to reject terrorism and the development of weapons of mass destruction—has begun to lose much of its strength. I am prepared to accept that one of reasons why Libya decided to return to the international fold and reject weapons of mass destruction was a fear that its leadership might go the way of Saddam Hussein. However, given that presumably even Donald Rumsfeld, or at least George Bush, would now have second thoughts about too hastily taking military action in Iraq and elsewhere, even that argument must have lost some validity. The greatest negative consequence of how the Iraq intervention has developed is that it has severely undermined the ability of the Governments of the countries that went to war in Iraq, including the UK, to obtain the consent of their peoples for future action against international and domestic terrorism. Similarly, their ability to gain the consent of their peoples for activities designed to help with the reconstruction of places such as Iraq has been undermined. Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab): Before my hon. Friend moves from discussing Libya, does he have a view about whether Pakistan would have been open about accepting its responsibility on nuclear proliferation if it had not been for the action in Iraq? Mr. Lazarowicz : Possibly not—probably not. However, the situation has moved on. That might have influenced the decisions of those Governments some months ago. However, the logical conclusion of any Government who, seeing the obvious difficulties in Iraq, were minded to get into the game of weapons of mass destruction would be that it is a lot less likely, because of the difficulties that the coalition is facing in Iraq, that even the current US Administration would do to them what they did to Iraq. The situation has developed in the past few months because of those difficulties. If the war on terror has been undermined by the Iraq invasion, we should not be surprised if, in future, people in our country are sceptical, not just about some of our country's policies on international security, but when we attempt to deal with the threat of terrorism here. That is a real threat. Recent events not so far away have illustrated the vulnerability of our society and political system to such threats. All that underlines the continuing validity of the Select Committee's second conclusion in the paragraph to which I referred earlier, which states: "A successful transfer of power to an internationally-recognised Iraqi government, which has the support of the Iraqi people and which is recognised by Arab and muslim states generally, offers an important opportunity to reduce that threat and to assist the process of reform and stabilisation in the region." For the purposes of today's debate, I emphasise the point made that it also reduces the threat of terrorist attack against British nationals and British interests. Since the Select Committee reached that conclusion, events have served only to strengthen the arguments in its favour. Such a transfer of power is no longer an important opportunity: it is clearly the only way out. Our Government must make it clear to the US that we want a genuine transfer of sovereignty and authority with no qualifications, not occupation in another guise, with the political and security process under the overall supervision of the United Nations. I hope that I do not disagree with any hon. Member present, no matter what their views on the war in Iraq, when I say that there was certainly never overwhelming public support for the military action and that the war and its aftermath are now extremely unpopular with large sections—almost certainly a clear majority—of the British public. I am sure, too, however, that hon. Members who have told us today that Britain should not draw back from the responsibilities that it has acquired in Iraq by intervening are speaking for the majority of British public opinion. That opinion recognises, as do Members of the House, that having gone into Iraq, we have responsibilities that we cannot shirk. However, I believe that British public opinion would not be happy with more troops being sent to Iraq—certainly not if that was done in support of new responsibilities or moves into new areas, rather than to support a transfer of power, responsibility and authority along the lines that I have described. We need a fundamental change of policy, particularly by the US Administration, not just in Iraq but elsewhere in the middle east. As hon. Members have said, that is needed above all in Israel and Palestine. This debate is taking place the day after atrocities in Rafah—yet another criminal act by the Sharon Government. Before it, I checked the news to see whether the international condemnation of the Israeli Government had perhaps resulted in a drawing back of their forces from the actions that they have been taking in the past few days in the Gaza strip. However, far from withdrawing, it appears that the Government were intensifying their actions there earlier today. It has been said hundreds of times in this Chamber, and I reiterate it, that the continuing Israeli occupation of the west bank and Gaza and the failure to move towards a long-term peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians is one of the most significant factors in creating fertile ground in which terrorism can flourish, and from which terrorist groups can recruit not only in Palestine and the middle east but many other parts of the world. I welcome the fact that the United States Government have made some strong criticisms of Israeli actions in Gaza in the past few days. However, the occasional rebuke from Colin Powell is not good enough. Without concentrated and continued pressure on Israel from the USA, there is no real prospect of a peace settlement in the area. That concentrated pressure from the US Government has not been forthcoming. Everyone in the Chamber knows that. Despite the UK Government's genuine commitment to the middle east peace process, any objective analysis must conclude that we are going backward on the road to a settlement, not forward. Is it not time to conclude that, far from maintaining a policy of close co-operation with the US Administration, we could do no worse if we were more critical and more independent of their policies? I do not mean that we should be hostile or try to set ourselves up in opposition. We cannot do that, and it would be dangerous if we could. However, if we were more critical and independent of the Administration's policies, might we not also more successfully influence that Administration?
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20th May, Column 327-30 Westminster Hall